Tag Archives: cultural norms

Idiotics and mental illnes

by ABN

In a previous post (here), we defined idiotics to mean a combination of “idio” and “semiotics.” A person’s idiotics are unique to them and are not the same as the idioitcs of any other person.

Idiotics is a useful term as it allows us to denote the tangled web of meaning and symbology that underlies language and is woven into everything we say or do.

When there is no organic cause for mental illness, we would be right to strongly suspect that the source of the “illness” lies in the individual’s idiotics—the unique web of meaning and sensibility that gives rise to their perceptions, communicative acts, and self-awareness.

Since idiotics underlie language, cognition, and perception and give rise to virtually all acts of communication, a person with disturbed idiotics will also show disturbances in these areas.

Why do we need a separate term—idiotics—to describe mental/emotional problems when existing terms already work well enough?

The reason is the core problem in mental illness without an organic cause is not speech, not communication, not perception, and not cognition. It is a person’s idiotics. That is to say, their use of meaning and their perception of meaning—these bases of cognition and communication—are filled with mistakes.

If we investigate only a person’s experience and extrapolate from that “causes” of their mental illness, we will very often be led astray because we will be attempting to cure a fairly concrete malady by addressing the ambiguities of memory and the falsity of self-assessment through the use of a subjective system of appraisal. It doesn’t matter that vague statistics can and have been compiled on what kinds of experiences lead to what sorts of mental disturbances, because there are as many exceptions and deviations from these data as there are comformances to them. At best, data of this sort describes correlations. But correlations of what? No one can really say.

If we use a concept like idiotics, we can begin to work with good data that can be called objective by many standards. The gold standard for working with data of this sort is FIML practice and the gold standard of psychological objectivity between two people is the degree to which they can agree on what has just been said or communicated. If both partners agree on what was just said, their standard of objectivity is quite high, probably as good as can be achieved without very sophisticated brain scanning equipment, which does not yet even exist.

When a patient works with a professional analyst, this high degree of objectivity cannot be attained. This is so because the analyst, at best, can only rely on an extrinsic standard of objectivity and this standard is fully subject to the faulty idiotics of the analyst herself. If an analyst tries to avoid this problem by sticking strictly to “objective” extrinsic standards, she will fail to address the subjective, intrinsic idiotics of the patient she is trying to help. She can only communicate with her patient on a useful level by engaging the patient’s idiotics with her own. But there rarely is enough time for this and it is unlikely that patient and analyst will be compatible for this sort of practice.

So what’s an analyst to do? If the patient has a friend they can do FIML with or if such a friend can be found for them teach them how to do FIML. Check on them often enough to be sure they are doing it correctly. In some cases, advanced instruction can be given in areas of particular interest to the FIML partners if the analyst feels competent to do so.

What about patients who have no friends and for whom no friends can be found? Or patients who are not capable of doing FIML? Patients of this type can and should be treated by the other best practices of the day.

Idiolects and idiotics

by ABN

An idiolect is the “dialect” of one person. It is unique to that person. We all speak an idiolect unique to us. No one else speaks in exactly the same way as you do. In fact, the varieties of idolects among speakers of even the same dialect can be quite pronounced, to say nothing of speakers who have been acculturated to different dialects.

Virtually, the same thing is true for our use and understanding of semiotics. Each one of us has a unique tangle of semiotics even if we share the same culture. Even if two people were born and raised in the same very strict cult, they will have different takes on their “shared” semiotics; they will see thier semiotics in individual and unique ways.

The term “idiolect” is a blend of the prefix idio, which means “own, personal, distinct to the individual” and the suffix lect, which is taken from the word “dialect.”

In that spirit, I want to coin the term “idiotics” to mean “the semiotics unique to one person.” Each and every one of us has a very complex idiotics.

It is profoundly important to know this and to understand it deeply.

We can talk at length about the generalities of our idiotics and profit from discussions like that. But we will never fully grasp what our idiotics do, how they function, and when they come into play unless we tackle them the moment they arise.

This is so because idiotics are very complex, with many parts bonded and tangled together in unique ways. The only time we can really get anything approaching an objective view of them is when they arise as small bits within real-life conversations. We can only see them when they function in the moment, when they touch our emotions in the moment, when they determine how we hear, speak, or respond in the moment.

General discussions lead away from idiotics because general discussion by their very natures (being general) are not unique to the individual. By definition, generalities are not idiotics.

This is one reason it is possible (indeed, common, I believe) for individuals to feel horribly lonely while in the company of other people. Or to feel horribly lonely when trying to explain yourself as you get more and more lost in generalities.

If you are never able to deal with, contend with, analyze, or remark upon you or your partner’s idiotics, you will have a bad time.

FIML practice works because it works with idiotics. Ironically, working with your own and your partner’s idiotics will make you much smarter.

Forgiveness

by ABN

We don’t have the power to forgive. But we can hope that those who have harmed us will feel shame and reform.

That outcome—their feeling shame and reforming—is far better than our forgiving them and  infinitely better than wishing harm on them, wishing for revenge.

Forgiveness should mean “forbear until those who have harmed us reform.”

When we have been harmed we have a choice between forbearance and revenge. If we choose revenge our minds will be clouded and we will bring more harm into the world. If we forbear, the harm that has been done will stop with us.

And if, as we forbear, we hope—indeed, pray—that those who have harmed us reform, we will feel little or no need to want revenge. The desire for revenge will be weak if it arises at all. For what could be better than the person who has harmed us reforming completely? That is, feeling shame, vowing never to repeat their harmful act, making amends for their harm.

What could be better than that?

We do not desire that the person who has harmed us feel shame to cause them pain, but only because shame is essential to reform, to making the vow to never repeat the harmful act against anyone. Shame cleanses the harm and ensures it will not recur.

When we have been harmed, there is nothing better to wish for.

And there is no need for public shame. All that is needed is real shame leading to the complete renunciation of harm.

This is how all of us—for all of us have been harmed—can reduce suffering in the world.

FIML and karma

by ABN

FIML illustrates karma in the sense that karma is an action that initiates a cycle of cause and effect.

For example, if you do not care about what your partner is saying, you will not understand how you are listening and thus you will not understand yourself. If you are not honest with your partner, similarly, you will not be able to perceive the depths of meaning in your listening and speaking. Your not caring and/or not being honest are actions that will initiate a cycle of delusion, a cycle of less than optimal communication, less than optimal mutual understanding, and less than optimal self-understanding.

You harm yourself when do not care or are not honest. Of course, there are degrees of caring and honesty. But if partners do these actions well-enough, they will see for themselves that caring even more and being even more honest has very real and very important benefits for each of them.

If you care about what your partner is saying, you will come to understand how ideas, values, and meanings actually function in your mind during dynamic moments of communication. And this will save you from a great deal of delusive thinking and feeling. The same is true for being honest. If you are honest with your partner, you will help them free themselves from delusive thinking and feeling. They will see that you are being honest and respect you for that. In return they will be more honest with you.

And all of this will become clearer and clearer to both partners as they progress in FIML practice. These cycle of good karma—good cause and effect—will enrich and liberate both partners

In addition to the above, it is good to see that there are significant selfish reasons to be honest and to care about your partner.

Holocaust: The Ignored Reality

by ABN

by Timothy Snyder

Link

Well-worth reading.

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One way to comprehend the madness of the 20th century as described in Snyder’s essay is through semiotics as we define and use the term in FIML practice. In FIML practice the active, functional semiotics of the individual are constantly being questioned and resolved with the help of a partner. Without FIML, individual semiotics are never fully understood by the individual, who is consequently forced to adopt public semiotics to define their, now, entirely elusive “self.”

During the 2oth century, and still today, many people assert public meaning/semiotics in place of having authentic individual comprehension of themselves. The more assertive the person, the more their “meaning” seems to have meaning, or value. Others simply follow assertive people. Dictators and other maniacs described in Snyder’s essay are fundamentally asserting violent public “meaning,” rather than acquiring genuine individual meaning on their own.

This also goes a long way to explain why so much of the world today, as yesterday, willingly follows less violent psychopaths and/or shallow media personalities: their assertions of meaning are simply stronger than what the individual is capable of finding for themselves.

In contrast, individuals who practice FIML will notice that their need to take meaning from strong public-asserters decreases in proportion to their capacity to comprehend their own individual and much more authentic meaning.